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Book Review
THE DUTY TO CONSULT: NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, by Dwight G. Newman'
JANNA PROMISLOW

2

DWIGHT G. NEWMAN'S THE DUTY TO CONSULT' is a handbook on a part of

Canadian Aboriginal law that is in need of further explication. Echoing the nascent character of the doctrine in question, the Associate Professor at the University of Saskatchewan College of Law has approached this project as one that will
evolve over time.' Newman is known for his strong, theoretically oriented
work,' but in this compact volume he undertakes to reach a broader audience,
beyond law and academe, on a topic he considers to be of "fundamental importance" for all Canadians.' In The Duty to Consult, Newman strikes a balance
between highlighting key issues from the mass of context-specific material that
this field has rapidly spawned and shedding light on the big picture. As such,
the book is a valuable resource for both consultation practitioners and big picture thinkers alike.
The layout of the book demonstrates how the constitutional duty to consult involves many actors and pushes Aboriginal relations into the daily practice
of government, especially in the areas of land use and resource development.

1.

(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009) 127 pages [Newman, Duty to Consult].

2.

Ph.D. Candidate and Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Senior
Advisor, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Government of Ontario. The views expressed in this
review are the author's own and do not reflect those of the Ministry.

3.
4.

Newman, Duty to Consult, supra note 1 at 10.
See Dwight G. Newman, "Duty to Consult Resource Page," online: <http://www.
thedutytoconsult.com>.

5.

See e.g. "You Still Know Nothin' 'Bout Me: Toward Cross-Cultural Theorizing of
Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 52 McGill L.J. 725; "Prior Occupation and Schismatic Principles:
Toward a Normative Theorization of Aboriginal Title" {2007) 44 Alta. L. Rev. 779.

6.

Newman, Duty to Consult,supra note 1 at 10.
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The early chapters set out the doctrine, with the focus shifting to non-judicial
actors mid-way through the book. This layout reflects Newman's argument for
a balance between judicial and non-judicial contributions in the development
of this area of Aboriginal law, an argument that is grounded in a realist-inspired
"law in action" frame of analysis. The influence of this frame of analysis is apparent in two key arguments. First, Newman is optimistic about the intersection
of the competing approaches to consultation taken by Aboriginal communities
and organizations, governments, and corporate participants. He suggests that
courts should hold back to allow these players to creatively work out contextappropriate approaches that rapid doctrinal development might cut off. Second, he points out that "good" consultation often encompasses concerns that are
important for reconciliation but which may not be addressed within the legal parameters of the duty to consult. Beyond these arguments, however, Newman refrains from articulating a clear theory of the duty to consult or offering any
overarching arguments regarding the direction of either the law or policy.
The lack of a big picture argument is surprising when chapter one starts the
book on such a strong theoretical note. There, Newman outlines the Supreme
Court of Canada's articulation of the duty to consult in HaidaNation v. British
Columbia (Minister of Forests),' Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (ProjectAssesment Director),' and Mikisew Cree FirstNation v. Canada
(Ministerof Canadian Heritage),' and then sets out four theoretical approaches
that he suggests will allow for a deeper understanding of the doctrine and an
anticipation of its future development: maintaining the Crown's honour; promoting negotiated settlements of Aboriginal claims; promoting reconciliation;
and supporting ongoing, dynamic relationships in a "generative constitutional
order.""o Newman occasionally brings these theoretical approaches back into
the discussion in later chapters-most notably, the reconciliation and relationship approaches-and demonstrates how an emphasis on a particular theoretical lens can push the development of the doctrine in one direction or another.
But he does not argue for the application of any particular lens over the others.
7.

[20041 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida].

8.

(2003), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River Tlingit].

9

[2005] S.C.R. 388 [Mikisew Creel.

10.

Newman, Duty to Consult, supra note 1 at 16-20. Newman's fourth approach-that which
results in a "generative constitutional order"--directly cites Brian Slattery's argument from
"Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown" (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 433.
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Instead, he avoids such an argument by advancing the four approaches as overlapping principles and concluding that the duty .to consult is a "complex doctrine" that needs room to grow in both "principled" and "localized" ways."
Chapters two and three review the parameters and content of the duty to
consult, surveying lower court and some quasi-judicial agency decisions. Chapter two deals with the legal issues around when the duty arises-namely, the
knowledge threshold and actions that trigger the duty. It also highlights emerging doctrinal issues, such as identifying appropriate consultation partners, as
well as the standards of review and the remedies that are available when courts
or quasi-judicial tribunals review the adequacy of consultations. This chapter
provides an astute review of the parameters of the duty, but falls short in its
brief treatment of the complex nature of the Crown. Although Newman states
that the "constitutional duty to consult is one owed in a certain sense by an undivided Crown,"12 his exploration of this issue is limited to information-sharing
problems within government. He misses the issues created by the divisibility
and indivisibility of the federal and provincial Crowns and does not address
questions about how creatures of statue, such as municipalities, are understood
for the purposes of this doctrine. Given that these complex issues potentially
affect both the knowledge trigger and the identification of consultation partners, they deserve some attention here.
The third chapter maintains the focus on case law, fleshing out the content
of the duty across the spectrum that the Supreme Court set out in Haida, while
also bringing non-judicial actors into the picture by flagging that "good consultation" may not be defined by,. or may differ from, the legal minimums defined
by the courts." The "law in action" analysis is put to good use when Newman
reviews Saskatchewan's draft FirstNations and Mdtis Consultation Policy Framework." By comparing the consultation obligations that result from a decision
matrix contained in the Framework to the obligations stipulated by the Haida
spectrum, Newman illustrates that the implementation of the duty may involve
content choices that depart from the doctrine. A discussion of accommodation
is also part of this chapter, and-like the case law on the subject-it is brief.
11.

Ibid.at 94 .

12. Ibid.at 36.
13.

Ibid at 46-47.

14. Government of Saskatchewan, "First Nation and M6tis Draft Consultation Policy Framework"
(December 2008), online: <http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca/Consultation-Draft-Framework/>.
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Newman notes that the few cases that have explored this aspect of the duty to
consult to date have done so only in terms of avoiding irreparable effects and
minimizing harm to Aboriginal interests, thereby leaving the question of what
constitutes appropriate accommodation open and uncertain. In the hard cases,
where accommodation measures may involve high costs with the potential to
effectively shut down a project, Newman suggests that parties can-and
must-act without court guidance, observing that "[n]o doctrine can make
for easy choices.""
Chapter three also includes a discussion of "economic accommodation," referring to various resource revenue-sharing arrangements that are generally considered to be beyond the requirements of any particular instance of the duty.
Newman indicates that although judges have approached economic accommodation with hesitation, compensation. for past breaches of consultation obligations
might be a claim that gains some traction in courts. Newman highlights the reconciliation theme when he expresses his preference for the language of economic
accommodation over compensation, seeing the former as more flexible and encompassing a wider range of revenue-sharing arrangements that are better suited
to the forward-looking orientation of reconciliation. This theme is also present in
the chapter's conclusion, where Newman argues that consultation conducted to
satisfy legal minimums under the duty to consult may miss the longer-term solutions and negotiations required for reconciliation and for successful ongoing relationships. It is a discussion that highlights the limitations of the duty, in its
present doctrinal construction, to foster the processes through which these aims
might be satisfied.
Non-judicial contributors to the development of the duty to consult take
centre stage in chapters four and five, which survey the consultation policies
of the main players-governments, First Nations and M6tis communities,
and corporations and other industry participants (chapter four)-as well as
comparative approaches from international law and Australia (chapter five).
These chapters provide a useful synopsis of key issues and developments
through a selective survey of materials. One section that could benefit from further elaboration is the section on government policies, particularly in relation
to legislative proposals. The section mentions British Columbia's now defunct

15.

Newman, Duty to Consult, supra note 1 at 60.
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Recognition and Reconciliation Act 1 6 and the recent amendments to Ontario's
Mining Act,17 but further exploration of legislative models-and in particular,
the vast differences between British Columbia's attempt and the sectorspecific approach in the Ontario context-would be welcome. This gap is
filled, to some extent, by the discussion around Australia's Native Title Act,
1993 in chapter five. There, Newman suggests that the distribution of powers
in Canada-and specifically, the federal power over Aboriginal title and
rights" and provincial jurisdiction over natural resources" -renders it more
probable that further guidance around the duty to consult will be pursued
through provincial policies rather than legislation.20 While Newman's prediction may be right, this comment begs for further analysis and consideration.
What evidence (particularly under a "law in action" frame of analysis) suggests that the division of powers inhibits or leads Canadian jurisdictions away
from legislative solutions? What other factors might contribute to the lack of
legislative proposals to guide the implementation of the duty to consult?
More importantly, are provinces, which are constitutionally obligated to respect Aboriginal and treaty rights and carry out the bulk of consultations, better served by policies than by legislatively protected frameworks for working
with First Nations and other Aboriginal communities?
The analysis in chapter four, and more generally, also falls short in its
treatment of how the policies of the various players might interact when (again,
under a "law in action" approach) the law fails to cast a heavy enough shadow.
It is a problem that appears to stem, at least in part, from the lack of integration
of doctrinal concerns with the discussion in the policy chapter. This tendency is
apparent in Newman's interpretation of LabradorMitis Nation v. Newfoundland

16. A discussion paper was circulated by the B.C. government and B.C. First Nations Council
that outlines the scope of the legislative proposal. See "Discussion Paper for Implementing
the New Relationship," online: <http://www.gov.bc.ca/arr/newrelationship/down/
implementing.the-new-relationship_0309.pdf>.
17. An Act to Amend the MiningAct, S.O. 2009, c. 21.
18.

ConstitutionAct, 1867(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24), reprinted in R.S.C. 198,
App. II, No. 5.

19.

Ibid.at s. 92A.

20.

Newman, Duty to Consult,supra note I at 89.
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and Labrador (Ministerof Transportationand Works), 21 which he suggests opens
the door for organizations such as the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) to
represent non-status and M6tis communities in consultations.22 While this may
be true in terms of the decision's confirmation that Aboriginal communities
with credible rights claims may choose their agents for consultation purposes,"
Newman does his audience a disservice by divorcing the agency issues in the
decision from the significant evidence of Aboriginal rights that grounds the
court's decision in this case.2 1 Indeed, Newman's own discussion of the issue in
chapter two is more to the point, where, based on LabradorMitis Nation and
other decisions, he argues that representative bodies will be accepted by the
court when "the particular body either represents directly the interests of the
relevant Aboriginal communities or is specifically authorized to do so." 25 The
"relevance" of Aboriginal communities is the critical point that he over-looks in
the analysis in chapter four: CAP's or any other organization's relevance as a
participant in any Haida consultation is dependent on the credibility of the
section 35 rights claims of the constituency or constituencies that it represents. 2
Newman has made some excellent choices in structuring this handbook
and selecting its content. Inevitably, however, his analysis is also limited by
these choices. Most critically, it only partially explores how the act of identify-

21.

288 D.L.R. (4th) 641, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 32468 (29 May 2008)[Labrador
Mitis Nation].

22.

Newman, Duty to Consult, supra note 1 at 70.

23.

LabradorMitis Nation, supra note 21 at paras. 46-49.

24.

Summarized in ibid. at para. 13.

25.

Newman, Duty to Consult,supra note I at 40. Newman notes a potential additional
requirement that the representative body not encompass "conflicting interests." This is an
interesting point that will require further explanation and analysis in future iterations. See
e.g. Naka'oamux Nation TribalCouncil v. Griffin, [2009] 4 C.N.L.R. 213 (B.C. S.C.) (in
which the court accepted different roles for a band and tribal-level government within the
duty to consult in spite of their conflicting positions regarding the project in issue and the
possibility of duplicate representation of the same community through the tribal council).

26.

CAP is a national body. Its members are affiliate provincially-based organizations, such as the
Labrador M6tis Nation (LMN). Unlike the LMN, there is no authorization via membership
in CAP to represent communities in duty to consult matters. For information about CAP's
political structure, see Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, "CAP Political Structure," online:
<http://www.abo-peoples.org/CAP/About/PoliticalStructure.html>.
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ing relevant participants in duty to consult matters implicates section 35 jurisprudence around the notion of an Aboriginal community and the renewal or
reform of its governance structures. As Brent Olthius points out, the test for
identifying section 35 rights-holding communities is largely unsettled, with R v.
Powley" constituting the extent of the Supreme Court's consideration of this issue
to date.28 Within this jurisprudential gap, the duty to consult functions as a
catalyst for change. It encourages new roles for nation-level organizations such
as tribal councils; it creates incentives for communities and organizations to reorganize their membership along jurisprudentially derived criteria in order to be
recognized as consultation partners; it may open the door for greater involvement of non-status or otherwise unrecognized communities in section 35 rights
matters;29 and it generates incentives for communities and organizations to create
guidelines and laws to try to achieve consultations on their own terms. These
dynamics will impact Indian Act" band governments, the evolution of selfgovernment, and the governance structure of Aboriginal communities in general. Thus, as Newman observes, the duty to consult may "inadvertently enhance the power of already relatively advantaged Aboriginal groups over more
disadvantaged ones."' But it is more in keeping with his optimistic view of the
potential products of "law in action" to consider how the duty to consult might
also erode the structures that maintain the power of the more advantaged groups
and provide the impetus for some long overdue reform and renewal of selfgovernment and claims processes.
A less optimistic view of "law in action" leads to greater emphasis on what
Newman's observations suggest about the limitations of the duty to consult
doctrine. While the duty pushes recognition and governance issues to the fore,
the doctrinal development to date is not (and perhaps never will be) sufficient
to force governments to provide an adequate framework for recognizing rightsholding communities, or negotiating land settlements and self-government
27.

[2003] 2 S.C.R. 207.

28.

Brent Olthius, "The Constitution's Peoples: Approaching Community in the Context of
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982" (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 1.

29.

See the discussion of CAP and LMN, above. See also National Association of Friendship
Centres, "The Government's Duty to Consult Urban Aboriginal People," online: <http://
www.nafc.ca/PDF/NAFC%20Duty/o20to%20Consult%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf>.

30. R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5.
31.

Newman, Duty to Consult, supra note 1 at 71.
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agreements (beyond existing treaty processes, although those might also be considered inadequate). This lack of influence is particularly interesting in light of
Newman's analysis of how the ramifications of any changes to Aboriginal rights
tests are intensified via the duty to consult. He suggests that, as a result, the
duty may inhibit the further development of the Aboriginal rights tests. 2 If this
doctrinal dynamic plays out, the branch of Aboriginal law that may more directly encourage the resolution of these rights issues will be limited by a branch
of Aboriginal law that, in spite of its massive impact on government and resource development, appears to lack the force required to catalyze progress on
the broader reconciliation processes. Regardless of how these dynamics eventually play out, both the potential and the limitations of the duty to consult doctrine to influence the larger picture of section 35 rights makes this interaction a
subject that, in a realist approach to "law in action," deserves greater attention.
These bits of incomplete analysis and the brevity of the book's conclusion
make it clear that Newman and his publisher have approached this project as a
work in progress. Given the evolutionary nature of the subject, this is a fair decision. It is indeed better to have this resource in its current state than not at all.
Those involved in the implementation and daily practice of the constitutional
obligation to consult are well served by Newman's synthesis of illustrative materials into an accessible and compact format. But I, for one, will look forward to
the next iteration of this project, and hope that it will bring better integration
of the analysis in various chapters, greater exploration of the difficult dynamics
unleashed by the duty to consult, and more emphasis on normatively sound
directions for the development of both doctrine and policy-all of which
Newman is well situated to deliver.

32.

Ibid. at 26-27.

